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The relationship between the objective accuracy of visual short-term memory (VSTM) rep-
resentations and their subjective conscious experience is unknown. We investigated this
issue by assessing how the objective and subjective components of VSTM in a delayed
cue-target orientation discrimination task are affected by intervening distracters. On each
trial, participants were shown a memory cue (a grating), the orientation of which they were
asked to hold in memory. On approximately half of the trials, a distracter grating appeared
during the maintenance interval; its orientation was either identical to that of the memory
cue, or it differed by 10˚ or 40˚. The distracters were masked and presented briefly, so
they were only consciously perceived on a subset of trials. At the end of the delay period,
a memory test probe was presented, and participants were asked to indicate whether it
was tilted to the left or right relative to the memory cue (VSTM accuracy; objective perfor-
mance). In order to assess subjective metacognition, participants were asked indicate the
vividness of their memory for the original memory cue. Finally, participants were asked
rate their awareness of the distracter. Results showed that objective VSTM performance
was impaired by distracters only when the distracters were very different from the cue,
and that this occurred with both subjectively visible and invisible distracters. Subjective
metacognition, however, was impaired by distracters of all orientations, but only when
these distracters were subjectively invisible. Our results thus indicate that the objective
and subjective components of VSTM are to some extent dissociable.
Keywords: visual short-term memory, visual awareness, visual processing, memory vividness, distracter
interference
INTRODUCTION
Dissociations between objective and subjective measures of behav-
ior are informative as to the underlying mechanisms of per-
ceptual and cognitive functions. For example, the dissociation
between subjective awareness of visual targets and their forced-
choice detection accuracy is a hallmark of blindsight, an influential
phenomenon in the field of visual awareness (see Cowey, 2010
for review). Consequently, the quality of subjective experiences
is increasingly being assessed in conjunction with conventional
accuracy measures; response scales such as the Perceptual Aware-
ness Scale (Overgaard et al., 2010; Sandberg et al., 2010) have
been developed for this purpose. These scales can assess the
so-called metacognitive sensitivity by revealing how well subjec-
tive ratings correlate with performance on objective detection or
discrimination tasks (e.g., Lau and Passingham, 2006).
In research on visual short-term memory (VSTM), the relation-
ship between the objective and subjective components of memory
representations has not been investigated. Recently, it has been
shown that working memory processes can operate unintention-
ally outside of conscious awareness (Hassin et al., 2009), as well
as on subliminally presented stimuli (Soto et al., 2011), indi-
cating that VSTM processes can be dissociated from conscious
experience. However, the relationship between the subjective expe-
rience of the memory representation and its objective accuracy has
not been investigated. These two aspects are conflated in standard
VSTM experiments, which involve both objective and subjective
components, but assess only the former (i.e., VSTM accuracy).
The aim of the present study was to assess and compare these
objective/subjective components by determining their suscepti-
bility to visual distracters presented during VSTM maintenance.
Subjective vividness of the VSTM content was measured on a trial-
to-trial basis in addition to assessing objective VSTM accuracy. We
used a paradigm known as “memory masking” (Magnussen et al.,
1991; Magnussen,2009), in which a distracter stimulus is presented
briefly during the interval between the memory cue and test. We
predicted that objective VSTM ought to be impaired when the dis-
tracter orientation is sufficiently different from the memory cue
(Silvanto and Soto, 2012). The critical question is whether or not
the subjective vividness component of VSTM would follow the
same pattern.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventeen participants who were naïve to the aims of the study,
took part in the experiment; of those three were excluded due
to chance level performance in the VSTM task; thus 14 partic-
ipants were included in the data analyses (six males, mean age
24 years). All participants provided informed consent and were
given a monetary reward for their participation.
STIMULI AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The stimuli were presented on a 19′′ (1280× 1024 pixels) CRT
monitor with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Stimuli and task were
controlled by E-Prime v2.0 (Psychology Software Tools Inc.,
Pittsburgh, USA; http://www.pstnet.com/eprime.cfm). The task
required the maintenance of a sinusoidal luminance-modulated
grating in VSTM while a masked distracter grating was presented,
on half of the trials, during the 3.1 s delay period (see Figure 1).
Each trial began with a black fixation point appearing in the mid-
dle of the screen for 1000 ms, followed by a blank screen for 500 ms.
The memory cue (orientation 10˚, 20˚, 30˚, 40˚, or 50˚ to the left
or right from vertical; 0.1 Michelson contrast; spatial frequency
1 cycle/˚; diameter 4˚ of visual angle from a viewing distance of
72 cm) was then presented for 300 ms, followed by a mask (a black
circle presented for 83 ms). On 50% of trials, a distracter was pre-
sented 1.5 s after the mask offset for 17 ms and its orientation was
either the same as that of the memory item, or it differed by 10˚
or 40˚. The spatial frequency, contrast, size, phase, and location
were the same as that of the memory cue. On half of the trials, no
distracter was presented. The distracter was followed by a mask
(83 ms), which was presented on all trials, even when no distracter
was presented. The average brightness of the background was the
average brightness of the gratings. At the end of the maintenance
period, fixation (500 ms) was presented, followed by the memory
test probe (tilted 10˚ either to the left or right relative to the mem-
ory cue) and observers had to indicate (during an unlimited time
window) whether the test probe was tilted to the left or right rel-
ative to the memory cue. This was indicated with a button press
(“1” for leftwards and “2” for rightwards). After this response had
been given, a screen asking participants to rate their subjective
vividness of their memory representation appeared; subjects were
instructed that they should report vividness as it was at the end of
the delay period (the specific instruction was “How vivid was the
memory item in your memory?”), on a 1–9 scale similar to used
in studies on visual imagery (e.g., Baddeley and Andrade, 2001),
in which 1 means the absence of a mental image and 9 refers to
an image that is as clear and vivid as visual perception of the grat-
ing. Finally, after the vividness response had been given, a screen
prompting participants to report whether they had perceived the
visual distracter appearing during the maintenance period, using
a 4-point scale, adapted from Overgaard et al. (2010) and Sand-
berg et al. (2010): 1= did not see the distracter; 2=maybe saw
something; 3= saw the distracter but not its orientation; 4= saw
the distracter and its orientation. The response windows had no
time limit. A blank screen (duration 1 s) was presented before the
next trial commenced.
The combination of memory cue orientation (either 10˚, 20˚,
30˚, 40˚, or 50˚); distracter condition (No Distracter, 0˚ difference
relative to the memory cue, 10˚ difference, or 40˚ difference) and
correct response in the memory task (left or right) produced a
combination of 40 different trial types. The experiment was run
in six blocks of 80 trials. The trial selection was fully randomized,
such that each trial was randomly chosen from all possible trial
types, with the weight of “No Distracter” trials being the same
as that of all “Distracter” present trials combined (i.e., the likeli-
hood of a No Distracter trial was set to be 50%). The mean total
number of trials for each of the condition was: No Distracter con-
dition= 229 trials; 0˚ distracter condition: 84 trials; 10˚ distracter
condition: 84 trials: 40˚ distracter condition: 82 trials.
RESULTS
We first assessed the relationship between the VSTM accuracy and
vividness, independently of any effect induced by the distracters;
this is shown in Figure 2A. As expected, there is a positive corre-
lation between the two, with high VSTM performance associated
with high levels of vividness. This correlation was statistically sig-
nificant (Pearson’s r = 0.459; p< 0.01). The mean frequency of
responses at each level of the vividness scale is shown in Figure 2B.
Proportion of visibility responses for the visual distracter pre-
sented during the maintenance period is shown in Figure 2C.
We additionally used signal detection theory to derive a mea-
sure of perceptual sensitivity for the distracter. A hit was defined
responses where participants reported occurrence of the distracter
(i.e., responses 2, 3, 4) when it was actually present (i.e., distracter-
present trials). False alarms were defined as the same responses
on trials where the distracter was absent (i.e., on “No Distracter-
trials”). The mean d ’ score was 1.52 (SD= 0.61), and the criterion
0.183 (SD= 0.37). This d ’ value indicates that participants were
generally able to detect the distracter at a level which is clearly
above chance, indicating that the mask did not render the dis-
tracter fully invisible. The criterion value being close to 0 indicates
that the participants had no consistent bias toward reporting either
distracter presence on “No distracter”-trials or distracter absence
on “distracter-present” trials.
We then divided the trials according to distracter visibility. Tri-
als on which subjects reported full unawareness of the distracter,
i.e., response “1” on the scale of Overgaard et al., 2010; “did not
see the distracter”) were classified as “reported unawareness.” This
corresponded to on average 31% (SD= 14) of distracter-present
trials. The trials where participants correctly indicated awareness
of the distracter (i.e., responses 2–4 on the scale of Overgaard et al.,
2010) were classified as “reported awareness”. When no distracter
was presented, participants reported unawareness (i.e., response
“1”) of the distracter on average 79% (SD= 16) of trials. Only
these trials are included in the “No Distracter” condition in the
analyses below (i.e., false alarms were not included).
IMPACT OF DISTRACTER VISIBILITY AND ORIENTATION ON VSTM
ACCURACY
Figure 3A shows VSTM accuracy as a function of distracter
visibility and orientation. We first assessed the impact of dis-
tracter visibility and orientation on the accuracy of VSTM by
means of repeated-measures ANOVA with distracter visibility
(subliminal; visible distracter) and orientation difference rela-
tive to memory cue (0˚, 10˚, 40˚) as main factors. (This ANOVA
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 62 | 2
Bona et al. VSTM accuracy and subjective vividness
FIGURE 1 |Timeline of an experimental trial. Participants were asked to
hold in memory the orientation of a grating; at the end of each trial, they
performed an orientation discrimination task (indicating whether a test
probe was tilted to the left or right relative to the memory cue). On half of
the trials, a visual distracter (a grating with the same size, contrast and
spatial frequency as the memory cue) was presented in the middle of the
delay period; the orientation of this distracter could be identical to that of
the memory cue, or it could differ by 10˚ or 40˚. In addition, participants
were asked to rate the subjective vividness of their memory representation
as it was at the end of the delay period (“How vivid was the memory item in
your memory?”), on a 1–9 scale, in which 1 means the absence of a mental
image and 9 refers to an image that is as clear and vivid as visual perception
of the grating. Finally, observers were asked to indicate whether they had
perceived the visual distracter appearing during the maintenance period,
using a 4-point scale, adapted from Overgaard et al. (2010) and Sandberg
et al. (2010): 1=did not see the distracter; 2=maybe saw something;
3= saw the distracter but not its orientation; 4= saw the distracter and its
orientation.
included only distracter-present trials; distracter-absent trials were
not included.) This revealed a significant effect of orientation
difference [F(2,26)= 10.87; p= 0.0001; partial η2= 0.455] but
no main effect of distracter visibility [F(1,13)= 0.43; p= 0.53]
and no interaction [F(2,26)= 0.71; p= 0.50]. Pairwise compar-
isons on the factor “orientation difference” (collapsing over the
non-significant factor “visibility”) revealed that, relative to all
other conditions, memory accuracy was reduced when distracter
orientation differed from the memory cue by 40˚ [vs. 0˚ distracter :
t (13)= 3.55; p= 0.004; vs. 10˚ distracter: t (13)= 4.32; p= 0.001].
No other significant effects were found.
We carried out a separate set of t -tests to compare the impact of
the distracter relative to the No Distracter condition. A significant
reduction in accuracy was observed relative to the No Distracter
condition in both the visible [t (13)= 3.08; p= 0.009] and invisi-
ble [t (13)= 4.02; p= 0.001] conditions for the 40˚ condition. No
other significant effects were found. In short, VSTM accuracy was
reduced when the distracter differed from the memory cue by 40˚,
regardless of whether the distracter was consciously perceived.
IMPACT OF DISTRACTER VISIBILITY AND ORIENTATION ON
SUBJECTIVE VSTM VIVIDNESS
Figure 3B shows subjective VSTM vividness as a function of dis-
tracter visibility and orientation. We first assessed the impact
of distracter visibility and orientation on vividness by means
of repeated-measures ANOVA with distracter visibility (sub-
liminal; visible distracter) and orientation difference relative
to memory cue (0˚; 10˚; 40˚) as main factors. (This ANOVA
included only distracter-present trials; distracter-absent trials
were not included). A significant main effect of visibility was
found [F(1,13)= 4.97; p= 0.04; partial η2= 0.277], with subjec-
tive vividness being significantly worse in the subliminal con-
dition. However, neither a main effect of distracter orienta-
tion [F(2,26)= 0.11; p= 0.90] nor an interaction of visibility by
distracter [F(2,26)= 1.89; p= 0.17] was found.
We carried out a separate set of t -tests to compare the
impact of the distracter relative to the No Distracter condition.
Relative to the No Distracter condition, a significant reduc-
tion in vividness was observed for all subliminal distracters
[0˚: t (13)= 5.32; p= 0.0001; 10˚: t (13)= 3.34; p= 0.005; 40˚:
t (13)= 4.15; p= 0.001] but not for any of the visible dis-
tracters [0˚: t (13)= 0.90; p= 0.38; 10˚: t (13)= 1.68; p= 0.12;
40˚: t (13)= 1.19; p= 0.26]. Thus subjective VSTM vividness
was reduced by distracters of all orientations when partici-
pants reported unawareness of them. In contrast, distracters
that participants reported to be aware of had no significant
impact.
We also assessed whether performance on Distracter-absent tri-
als on which participants reported the presence of a distracter (i.e.,
false alarms) differed from trials on which participants indicated
correctly the absence of the distracter (i.e., correct rejections).
There was no difference between these trials types for neither
VSTM accuracy [t (13)= 0.03; p= 0.97] nor subjective vividness
[t (13)= 1.60; p= 0.13]. The mean VSTM accuracies were 0.77
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Mean (n=14) objective VSTM accuracy as a function of
subjective VSTM vividness. On each trial, in addition to performing the
objective VSTM discrimination task, participants were asked to provide a
rating of the subjective vividness of their memory representation using a
1–9 scale. As expected, there was a positive correlation between these
measures, with high VSTM accuracy associated with high levels of
subjective vividness. This correlation was statistically significant (Pearson’s
r =0.459; p<0.01). Error bars indicate ±1 SEM. (B)The distribution of
participants’ responses on the vividness scale. On each trial, participants
were asked to indicate the subjective vividness of their memory
representation on a scale ranging from 1 to 9. The figure indicates the
proportion of responses for a given category of vividness. (C) Proportion of
visibility responses for the masked visual distracter presented during the
maintenance period for the No Distracter- and Distracter-Present
conditions.
A
B
FIGURE 3 | (A) Mean (n= 14) objective memory accuracy in the VSTM task
as a function of the distracter orientation and visibility. The impact of the
visual distracter on VSTM accuracy was determined by the orientation
difference between the memory cue and the distracter; a reduction in
accuracy was observed only when this difference was 40˚. Distracter
visibility did not influence this effect; a disruptive effect was observed
regardless of whether participants rated the distracter to be visible. Error
bars indicate ±1 SEM. (B) Mean (n=14) subjective VSTM vividness as a
function of the distracter orientation and visibility. The impact of the visual
distracter on subjective vividness of the memory representation was not
modulated by the orientation of the distracter. Rather, all distracter
orientations reduced vividness ratings, but only when the visual distracter
was judged not to be visible. Thus a double dissociation in the effects of
distracters on VSTM accuracy and subjective vividness was found: the
impact on VSTM accuracy depends on the orientation difference between
the memory cue and the distracter but not distracter visibility; the impact
on subjective vividness of the memory item was determined by distracter
visibility but not by orientation difference.
(SD= 0.17) and 0.77 (SD= 0.10) for false alarm and correct
rejection trials, respectively. For vividness, the mean ratings were
6.15 (SD= 1.20) and 6.50 (SD= 0.84) for false alarm and correct
rejection trials, respectively.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between
objective and subjective components of VSTM by assessing their
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susceptibility to distracting visual information. For VSTM accu-
racy, interference was observed when the orientation of the dis-
tracter differed from the memory cue by 40˚; no effect was found
when they differed by 0 or 10˚. The effect on accuracy was not
modulated by cue visibility. In contrast, VSTM vividness was
impaired by distracters of all orientations, but only when par-
ticipants reported unawareness of them. That the objective and
subjective components of VSTM are differentially susceptible to
distracting visual input provides the first evidence (to the best of
our knowledge) that their underlying mechanisms are to at least
some extent distinct. These results cannot simply be due to either
VSTM accuracy or vividness being more susceptible to distracters,
as a double dissociation in the effects of distracter visibility and
orientation was observed. It is important to note that overall there
was a clear positive correlation between VSTM accuracy and its
subjective vividness, indicative of high metacognitive sensitivity.
In other words, subjective vividness ratings generally reflected the
accuracy of short-term memory.
Our results on VSTM accuracy of orientation information fit
well with previous memory masking literature on how visual
distracters affect the accuracy of representations held in VSTM
(Magnussen et al., 1991; Magnussen, 2009). In these previous
studies, participants’ ability to maintain the spatial frequency of
the memory cue was assessed; the disruptive effect of the distracter
increased as its spatial frequency moves away from the memory fre-
quency; no masking effect was found when the spatial frequency of
the memory and distracter gratings were similar (e.g., Magnussen
et al., 1991). The largest impairment was found at a difference
of ±1 octave, the width of spatial frequency channels reported in
psychophysical studies (Blakemore and Campbell, 1969; Greenlee
and Magnussen, 1988). Thus the effects reported by Magnussen
and colleagues are likely to reflect competition between spatial fre-
quency channels. Our study mirrors these results in the domain of
VSTM for orientation information: a disruptive effect on VSTM
accuracy was found when the distracter differed from the mem-
ory item by 40˚, indicative of competition between orientation-
selective channels, the width of which is believed to be in the range
of 30˚–40˚ (e.g., Blakemore and Campbell, 1969; Campbell and
Maffei, 1971; Greenlee and Magnussen, 1988). In short, the present
result on accuracy may reflect competition between orientation-
selective channels, mirroring previous studies on spatial frequency
(Magnussen et al., 1991).
In contrast, VSTM vividness was reduced by all distracter
orientations, but only when participants reported being fully
unaware of them. A simple speculative explanation is that the
engagement of the visual system by visual input removes atten-
tional resources from the subjective mental image. Subliminal
distracters may be more effective in contaminating subjective
experience as they are less likely to be inhibited by top-down
control (Tsushima et al., 2006). Furthermore, conscious detection
of the distracter may have induced participants to allocate more
attentional resources to the memory representation, counteracting
any disruptive effect of the distracter. Such a strategic response
cannot occur if the distracter is not consciously perceived. This
finding is also consistent with the evidence that static visual noise
of which participants are aware does not impair visual imagery
(Quinn and McConnell, 1996, 2006; see also next paragraph).
While the relationship between memory vividness and distracter
awareness requires further study, the key finding here is that effect
on subjectiveVSTM vividness was not modulated by distracter ori-
entation. This indicates that the subjective component of VSTM is
not merely an extension of the underlying VSTM representation.
Rather, the objective and subjective components appear to be to
some extent distinct. It may be that the subjective experience of
VSTM representations requires an active processing “workspace”
that is separate from a passive VSTM store. Such a possibility was
suggested by Pearson et al. (1999), who proposed a distinction
between an active visual buffer for conscious visual representa-
tions, and a passive visual cache for unconscious storage of visual
representations. While the precise nature of the objective vs. sub-
jective distinction requires further study, the nature of interference
effects observed in the present study indicates that the objective
VSTM store relies on feature-specific mechanisms (such as ori-
entation channels) in the visual system, whereas its subjective
component does not.
These results could be seen to relate to the literature on visual
imagery, assuming that the subjective component of VSTM can be
equated with the subjective experience of mental images in con-
ventional imagery paradigms. Prior studies have used dynamic
visual noise (DVN) to investigate the cognitive structures under-
lying VSTM and imagery (Quinn and McConnell, 1996, 2006). In
these studies, the presentation of DVN has been shown to reduce
the ability to engage in mental imagery; in contrast, presentation of
static visual noise has no impact. The present work differs from this
line of research in a number of ways. Firstly,here we addressed both
VSTM accuracy and subjective VSTM vividness on a trial-to-trial
basis, enabling a direct comparison of the objective and subjective
components of the same stimulus. Such direct comparisons, to
the best of our knowledge, have previously not been carried out.
Secondly, the DVN is silent as to how the features and visibility of
distracting information modulate imagery and VSTM; the present
paradigm dissociates these aspects. Thirdly, the impact of stimulus
visibility has not been previously addressed; in the DVN paradigm,
the noise is always consciously perceived. It is worth noting that
the presentation of static visual noise has no impact on visual
imagery; our result that consciously perceived visual distracters
had no impact on subjective vividness is consistent with this.
A comparison of objective and subjective measures can raise
the question of the extent to which the obtained dissociations
are driven by differences in sensitivity between the measures.
One could argue that in the present study, objective accuracy
may have been less sensitive to the effect of distracter orienta-
tion because vividness was measured on a 9-point scale, whereas
accuracy was measured by a binary (left/right) decision; perhaps
a more sensitive scale might have revealed effects on accuracy at
other distracter orientation (as was found for vividness). However,
this explanation is not consistent with the finding that objective
accuracy and subjective vividness showed a double dissociation
in their sensitivity to different features of distracters (orienta-
tion and visibility), rather than vividness being generally more
susceptible to disruption. If it was indeed the case that vividness
was the more vulnerable of the two measures, then one would not
have observed a selective effect of distracter visibility on vividness
ratings (in which only subliminal distracters reduced vividness),
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given that VSTM accuracy was impaired by both subliminal and
visible distracters, as long as there was a large enough difference
(40˚) between the orientations of the memory cue and distracter.
Visual short-term memory accuracy and subjective vividness
on Distracter-absent trials on which participants reported the
presence of a distracter (i.e., false alarms) did not differ signifi-
cantly relative to trials on which participants indicated correctly
distracter absence (i.e., correct rejections). This is consistent with
the main results of the study, as VSTM accuracy was impaired only
by specific distracter orientations, and vividness was significantly
reduced only by stimuli of which participants were unaware. One
should note also that the effects reported here might be modu-
lated by participants’ criterion for reporting stimulus presence,
as this might alter the effect of unaware vs. visible distracters on
subjective vividness. Future studies manipulating the proportion
of distracter-present and distracter-absent trials are required to
determine this issue.
In summary, these results provide the first evidence that objec-
tive and subjective components of VSTM are to some extent
dissociable. What are these mechanisms? While the present results
do not offer a conclusive explanation, one could speculate the
following. That the impact of the distracter on VSTM accuracy
depended on the similarity between memory cue and distracter
orientation indicates that the WM representation makes use of
orientation channels in the visual cortex (e.g., Blakemore and
Campbell, 1969; Campbell and Maffei, 1971); subjective vividness
was not sensitive to orientation similarity, indicating it does not
reflect the activity of orientation channels. In contrast, subjective
vividness was sensitive to the visibility of the distracter, consistent
with the evidence that subliminal distracters are more difficult to
suppress, implicating prefrontal attentional control mechanisms
(Tsushima et al., 2006; Feredoes et al., 2011). VSTM accuracy
was not sensitive to distracter visibility, consistent with the idea
that it engages low-level orientation channels in the visual sys-
tem which operate independently of visual awareness. It should be
noted that this explanation is somewhat speculative and requires
further study.
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